



GLOBAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS FOR AFRICA –
USING THE SPACE CREATED

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The report hopefully reflects this collaboration

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1. INTRODUCTION

As a tool developed by Global Union Federations (GUFs) to bring a social dimension to economic globalization there is now a good deal of discussion on the role of Global Framework Agreements⁴ (GFAs) and their efficacy in serving this purpose. With the first GFA signed as recently as 1989, it is too early to decide whether GFAs are a useful tool in the struggle for global solidarity or not. It is though time to examine some of their limitations and to look at processes which could make them more useful. The current discussions however, make little reference to the issues and position of African workers and African trade unions in this regard and do not include the voices of these organisations and workers. This project is therefore focused on GFAs in Africa as a contribution to the global discussion.

The research explores the perceptions, expectations and issues that African trade unions have with GFAs, their relevance to Africa and usefulness in the African context. It argues that while the limitations are to be acknowledged and, where possible, overcome, Global Framework Agreements have created some useful space for African trade unions to organise, bargain, build campaigns, and to form alliances. This space may be smaller than some would like or expect from a global agreement, but it is recognised that the GFA is not the end of the battle, it is just one tool for organising workers to take on multinational corporations (MNCs) more strategically. If the small space created by the GFA is used effectively, further opportunities for engagement may be created.

The research therefore notes recommendations on what can be done by Global Union Federations at a global level, by GUFs at a regional (African) level, and by GUF national affiliates in Africa to engage with the GFA space for organising, democratising, educating and campaigning in Africa.

Of the 74 current GFAs⁵ 55 have been signed with MNCs that have operations in African countries and may therefore include African workers in the terms and the protections of the agreements.⁶ While the figure is small when compared to the number of MNCs operating globally and indeed in Africa that have not signed a GFA at all, the high proportion of agreements potentially affecting African workers and the increasing pace at which GFAs are being signed (Papadakis, 2008) represents an important new dimension in labour relations in Africa to be utilised in the struggle for decent work and global solidarity.

Most GFAs originate with European companies and are signed with GUFs through campaigns and negotiations led by the national unions in Europe and European Works Councils (EWCs). Indeed, Global Framework Agreements developed as an expansion on transnational social dialogue in industrial relations that is part of the history and founding of the European Union (Eurofound). However, GFAs are also now being pursued by unions outside of Europe with agreements being signed by GUFs with MNCs from Russia, United Kingdom, Japan and South Africa.

African trade unions operate in a national political environment where unions are often seen as threatening or opposing political vehicles, therefore facing challenges of being undermined by various political forces within their countries. Africa is also rife with the continued and increasing informalisation of work, with nearly 70 percent of all workers employed in a non-permanent basis of some sort. These new forms of employment

⁴ Global Framework agreements are also referred to by some GUFs as International Framework Agreements. In this report, the term Global Framework Agreement is used unless it is referred to in a quotation as International Framework Agreement.

⁵ There is no absolute agreement on the number of agreements signed, neither in the literature or on the websites. This number is drawn from the 2010 study by Fichter et al with a further agreement added following the signing of the GFA between GDF Suez and BWI, ICEM and PSI in November 2010.

⁶ This is from the LRS analysis of company operational spread from company websites and document, the number is therefore an estimate.

mean that workers are difficult to organise and therefore to include in the protections and improvements promoted by the GFAs. Workers and trade unions across Africa do not all face the same issues, within Africa there are also various contexts, challenges and levels of organisation among unions and any discussion must acknowledge this at the outset. However, there are some common concerns of access to the avenues of social dialogue, networks and training which present challenges for African affiliates in taking up the GFA space. How and whether these obstacles can be overcome is the subject of the recommendations arising out of the research.

2. METHODOLOGY

It has been decided to focus the research the relationship of African GUF offices and African national affiliates to the GFAs in which they are involved rather than to do a broad analysis of GFAs in general. There is currently a good deal of analysis of GFAs, including an in-depth study currently being undertaken at Berlin Free University⁸, which is feeding into a global discussion on the way forward with GFAs. However, this research does not deal directly with nor speak directly to African trade unions, their expectations, experiences and perceptions of GFAs.

In carrying out the research a literature review of current thinking was carried out as well as an analysis of the current GFAs that cover MNCs with operations in Africa. Questionnaires were sent to GUF Head Offices, GUF Africa Regional Representatives and African national affiliates and a focus group of GUF Africa Office representatives and South African national affiliates was held to discuss the issues raised in both the research and the questionnaires.

Because of this the overview of GFAs is kept brief and a literature review of some of these current studies focuses on drawing out the issues relevant to the key focus area rather than a more general analysis.

An analysis of current GFAs signed by companies with operations in Africa was completed in order to ascertain how many and which companies this may include. It also draws out some key content areas in the agreements as they deal with the core principles covered, the scope and reach of the agreements and the implementation and monitoring processes included in the text.

Engaging the GUFs at all levels was a central part of the research process in order to discover how each level of the GUF – global, regional African and national - understands the relevance and issues of GFAs in Africa. Questionnaires were drafted by the LRS for this purpose. Questionnaires were kept brief and set up on a mainly multi-choice basis (see Appendices two and three). Questions were qualitative, based on how each level of the GUF understands their and other's role in the GFA process as well as the perceived challenges of implementing GFAs in Africa. It was decided that the format could not deal with all issues without becoming unduly lengthy. Quantitative questions concerning the number and type of involvement of African trade unions in GFA processes were not included as it was not clear that any one respondent would hold this information.

Two questionnaires were drafted in order to draw out the perceptions that GUFs, at a global, regional and national affiliate level have of GFAs in Africa. The first questionnaire was sent to GUF headquarters and GUF regional representatives in Africa.

⁸ Fichter, M., Helfen, M., & Sydow, J. (2010). *International Framework Agreements - A Road to Global Industrial Relations?* Freie Universität Berlin, Department of Management & Otto-Suhr-Institute of Political Science. Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin. Much of the preliminary research on GFAs for this project was drawn from this study with gratitude.

Emails with links to an online survey were sent to each General Secretary and Regional Representative of eight GUFs (the PSI, BWI, IUF, ITF, ITGLWF, UNI, ICEM, and IMF), briefly explaining the project aims and process. Responses were received from four GUF Head Offices and seven GUF Africa regional offices. In some cases, a response was received from either the global or regional GUF delegating responsibility for completion of the questionnaire to the other office so that completed responses were received from three GUF HQs and six regional offices. While the introductory emails had made clear the purpose of eliciting responses from both offices it may be that there is a definite separation of responsibilities in certain GUFs when it comes to dealing with regional matters or an indication that a genuine synergy between head office and regional office in these matters is assumed. However, the responses of those GUFs that submitted from both regional and head offices shows that there are important differences in how head and regional offices view roles and responsibilities with relation to GFAs, highlighting perhaps a lack of clarity on where responsibility lies as well as describing the differing experiences of GFAs in Africa from a regional and global level.

The second questionnaire to national affiliate trade unions were, for the most part the same as the first but extended to include more union specific questions. National Affiliates were selected both strategically – seeking out those that were most likely to be covered by the GFA of the GUF to which they were affiliated, and pragmatically – where email addresses were available. It was acknowledged at the outset that the response rate may not be particularly high for the reasons noted below, and therefore the large number of questionnaires sent out was to ensure the best chance of at least some input from national affiliates.

The sample included unions from Morocco, Tunisia, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa. The wide selection of unions, countries and affiliations it was hoped, would bring a diverse group of viewpoints to the light and also highlight possible commonalities. However, despite numerous reminders, the response rate was low. Responses were received from national affiliates of five of the GUFs in eight countries, totalling eleven responses from South Africa, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya, and Ghana.

Possible reasons for the low response rate may include the fact that:

- Although Morocco and Tunisia were included as many of the MNCs that have signed GFAs have operations in these North African countries, it was accepted that as Francophone countries the chances of the unions responding easily to an English questionnaire were slim, as it has proved. As was highlighted in a later focus group, language barriers between affiliated African unions must be addressed as part of the organising and campaigning strategy of GUFs.
- National unions may be unaware of GFAs and feel ill-equipped to answer questions concerning them. This lack of communication and education surrounding GFAs is one limitation expressed in both the questionnaire responses and the focus group and indicates the need for further work around education and democratisation of the GFA space.
- National unions may be focussed on other issues and have limited resources to respond to queries of this nature. Questionnaire responses did voice the perception that African unions tend to be more nationally than globally focussed and this may have been the situation here.
- Email may not be the form of communication used by some national unions on a regular basis and email addresses used may be dormant. Past research has shown that email addresses change fairly frequently and contact lists are often not updated frequently enough to note this. The issue of networking and staying in touch is again one that is touched on in recommendations for organising.
- Emails may not have reached the correct person in the national union to answer the questionnaire.

- In some unions and countries the Labour Research Service is not known and so an email request would lack any authority for response. African GUF representative offices were invited to send out the questionnaires to their own national affiliates, though none took this offer up.

In order to expand on some of the issues noted in the questionnaires and to draw out experiences of GFAs in Africa, a focus group with senior representatives from the African GUF offices and representatives of national affiliates from South Africa was held in which the findings of the research and were opened up for discussion and recommendations for the way forward were proposed. These are presented and expanded upon in this report.

3. GFA OVERVIEW¹¹

As companies have stretched their operations and supply chains across the globe, so international trade law has assisted them in accessing new markets and new resources. However, this global economy, while granting MNCs new freedoms and opportunities, has not been accompanied by globalisation of social rights, labour rights and ultimately human rights to the workers within those companies. Companies have spread in search of new profit opportunities which has often meant seeking out areas of the globe where resources, including human resources, can be had very cheaply and without restriction. The situation is bad for both workers in the home countries of these companies, as jobs flow outwards to where the work can be done more cheaply, and workers in the new host countries, where they have to work without the protections and benefits afforded those in the country of origin. In the absence of internationally enforceable legislation to protect workers across the globe, other mechanisms had to be found to get MNCs to respect workers' rights wherever they had operations. The creation of GFAs by the GUFs evolved through various processes to meet this need (Bourque, 2008). Eurofound¹² traces the emergence of GFAs, and why it is they have emerged from Europe rather than the USA, Japan or other centres of multinational power, in treaties and agreements that followed the Second World War and entrenched social dialogue as the form of interaction between European states and their workers.¹³ While this is not to suggest that the process of achieving GFAs has been an easy one, it does highlight the context of cooperation rather than confrontation in European industrial relations that is suggested in literature.

PURPOSE

The GFA is not the GUF: GFAs are only one tool that GUFs have for campaigning for decent work and global solidarity; how that tool is used depends on the strategic priorities of each GUF. These in turn are influenced by the sectors in which GUFs operate and the particular issues they face in this regard. (Fichter, Helfen, & Sydow, 2010, pp. 11-14)

Despite their differences though, it is noted that under the broader strategy of developing a social dimension to economic globalisation, the aims of the GFA are (1) to improve the working conditions of workers across and

¹¹ As this is not a general study of GFAs, this overview is kept brief, a good introduction to the beginnings of GFAs refer to Borque, 2008, Papadakis, 2008 and Fitcher et al, 2010.

¹² Eurofound, the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, is a European Union body, one of the first to be established to work in specialised areas of EU policy. Specifically, it was set up by the European Council (Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1365/75 of 26 May 1975), to contribute to the planning and design of better living and working conditions in Europe.

¹³ The creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 arose out of the devastation of Europe in two world wars during the first half of the twentieth century. Although the ECSC ceased to exist in 2002, it had great significance in the development of EU employment and industrial relations. This first Treaty organisation was highly influential in establishing European social dialogue. Article 3 of the Treaty of Paris stated that among the purposes of the institutions of the new Community were 'to promote improved working conditions and an improved standard of living for the workers in each of the industries for which it is responsible' (Eurofound)

even beyond company operations and (2) to promote union organisation at local and global level (Muller, Platzer, & Rub, 2008, p. 7). This purpose is common across the GUFs because it is recognised that without workers organised into strong trade unions that are informed, educated and networked, MNCs cannot be properly monitored or held to account for anything. With trade unions representing workers at a local level, workers can also begin to bargain for the real practical gains that need to be made on the shop floor and ultimately the boardroom.

CONTENT¹⁴

The content of GFAs varies not just from GUF to GUF but from agreement to agreement. In this way they reflect the strategic priorities of the GUF, the negotiation process with the MNC engaged and the year in which they were signed; later GFAs often showing more detail on certain issues not highlighted by earlier agreements. In general they cover four main areas.

CORE CONVENTIONS¹⁵

The four core conventions of the ILO that are almost universally acknowledged in GFAs are the prohibition of child labour (ILO 138 and 192), the prohibition of forced labour (ILO 29 and 105), non-discrimination (ILO 100 and 111) and freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining (ILO 87, 98 and 135). The first three establish the minimum social standards expected from MNCs while the final one addresses the key area of trade union organisation. Depending on the GUF, sector, company and the focus of the home union, additional conventions of the ILO may also be covered in the GFA including conventions relating to wages, working time arrangements, health and safety and training. For example, the agreement between Ciett Corporate members and UNI includes specific ILO conventions that relate to contract and agency labour as part of the agreement.¹⁶ As is noted in the analysis of current GFAs below, not all GFAs make explicit reference to these conventions.

SCOPE AND SUPPLIERS

While the idea of a global agreement seems to imply that the agreements all cover every operation of the signatory company this is often not the case. Most though not all agreements do make some reference to the scope of the agreements. This again may be part of the strategic objectives of the GUF and/or the negotiation process with the company. Generally agreements do cover all operations over which the group has direct operational control or a majority shareholding. Some agreements though are restricted to those operations where the GUF is organised and recognised through national affiliates, others apply the agreement only where the current local conditions are not as favourable as those in the agreement.

Local conditions and legislation are another area that impact on the scope of agreements. Some GFAs note that the principles of the GFA shall not supersede local legislation. The Securitas agreement (2006) for example states that '[t]he parties acknowledge that social, cultural, legal and other factors may differ from country to country and that such differences naturally have to be taken into consideration in the application of the Code', while the Shoprite agreement (2010) states that '...different countries have different laws governing employment. Both Shoprite Checkers and UNI Global Union undertake to operate within the

¹⁴ For full tables relating to content in the various GFAs, see Papadakis, 2008, Fichter et al, 2010

¹⁵ See Appendix 1

¹⁶ Ciett / UNI memorandum of Understanding, 2008 states : **UNI and Ciett Corporate Members agree that a regulatory framework on temporary agency work must include and promote:** Principles as guaranteed by ILO Convention 181 and Recommendation 188 on private employment agencies, with a particular focus on the implementation of the no-fee charging rule for jobseekers for temporary assignments and permanent placement services provided by the temporary work agency; (Founded in 1967, Ciett consists of 42 national federations of private employment agencies and 6 of the largest staffing companies worldwide: Adecco, Hudson, Kelly Services, Manpower, Randstad and USG People.)

framework and jurisdiction of the applicable laws.’ The strongest restriction on the scope of the agreement in relation to local laws is stated in the G4S agreement (2008) which notes that that ‘[n]o part of the agreement is legally enforceable as each country has its own laws.’ These statements only underline the core function of the GFA to create just enough space for union organisation, even if that is simply local legislation, so that companies can be pushed to comply with international standards by worker power rather than just the principles in the GFA. Other agreements globalise some principles in the agreement, specifically the right to freedom of association, while curbing others to the limits of local law. In a recent focus group discussion, it has been noted that some GUFs are beginning to move to where they are insisting the MNCs acknowledge that the principles within the GFAs should not be undermined by weak national labour legislation and should be applicable regardless local laws.

The issue of scope also addresses the question of those operations where the MNC does not have direct, operational or industrial control or where it is not the major shareholder. Not all GFAs address the issue of subsidiaries outside of the direct control of the group, joint ventures, partnerships, subcontractors and ultimately suppliers. But many of them do make some reference to how the agreement impacts on their relationship with these other parties that are not signatories but part of the value chain of the organisation. The aim of the GUF is to get all of these parties included in the principles governing the GFA. However, in most cases the MNC will commit to at least informing the third parties while stressing that the agreement does not cover these relations. Some companies though have gone beyond this commitment to a second level of encouraging these partner companies to take up the GFA principles for themselves and that their willingness to do so is criteria for future engagements with the signatory company. Few companies stress that in principle, failure of everyone in the value chain to commit to the principles in the GFA would result in sanction and possible suspension of the relationship.

IMPLEMENTATION (COMPANY) AND MONITORING (UNION)

The issue of implementation and monitoring comes to the heart of what a GFA is.

Most, though not all agreements deal at least in passing with the issue of how the fact of the GFA, the information in the GFA and the responsibilities this implies will be disseminated both to the local managers at operations of the company and to the workers within those operations. Without some level of dissemination and implementation of the agreement within the operations, the GFA is nothing more than a **document**; it has no legal power and no third party to oversee it.

Implementation implies, though it is not always stated, that beyond the dissemination of the information concerning the GFA, some kind of process will be put in place to facilitate an on-going dialogue between the GUF and the MNCs and to allow for reporting on how well or poorly the company is **meeting the conditions of the agreement**. This often takes the form of an annual meeting of the signatories for a general discussion of issues, though some GFAs do more, including host unions and local managers in the dialogues and setting up special dispute resolution mechanisms at a local level.

The complementary structure to the implementation is the monitoring of the agreement. MNCs need to be monitored for their commitment to the principles of the agreements they have signed. This is more seldom mentioned in the GFAs. The principles of the agreement are for the company to implement, not the GUF; the company is committing to the principles, and may even commit to informing workers of this commitment, it is therefore part of the agreement the company signs up to. Monitoring is the job of the trade unions at local, regional and global level and is less likely to feature in the agreements. This said some include monitoring commitments, such as that included in the Italcementi agreement with BWI (2008):

- a) Both parties recognize that effective local monitoring of this agreement must involve the local management, the workers and their representatives, health and safety representatives and local trade unions.
- b) To enable local workers and union representatives of BWI affiliated unions to play a role in the monitoring process, they will be given adequate time for training and involvement in the monitoring process. The company will ensure that they are provided with information, access to workers, and rights of inspection necessary to effectively monitor compliance with this agreement.

As with the one above, some GFA texts would suggest that monitoring the agreement is up to both parties, but really this part is up to the union – if the union does not monitor properly, it is highly unlikely the company will police itself effectively.

While this is the standard idea of monitoring, it is suggested here and expanded below, that if the purpose of the GFA is not only to ensure the minimum social standards for workers but also to **create space for workers to organise**, then union organisation should also be monitored both from the perspective of how much union organisation is being allowed or obstructed by the MNC, and how well any space being created by the MNC is being taken up by national unions with assistance of the GUFs. GUFs, at national, regional and global must also monitor themselves. While it is agreed that the success of any agreement will depend on the strength of the unions at national level and full implementation of the global agreements is only possible when workers are organised in democratic trade unions and are able to bargain collectively at the national and enterprise level (International Federation of Building and Wood Workers, 2004, p. 7), it must also be recognised that in some cases it is the GFA itself that creates the space for organising and strengthening the unions that might otherwise not exist – that the process can work in both directions – and that as those unions strengthen, so does the space created for them to campaign and bargain more successfully for their workers.

4. GFAs IN AFRICA, CURRENT AGREEMENTS

A 2010 study suggests that there are around 74 active GFAs globally¹⁷, although this number is not confirmed. 55 of the companies with agreements have operations in one or more African countries. This is not to suggest that all of these operations are covered by the GFAs; given the ownership arrangements of companies and the scope of the agreements noted above, some, even many African operations might not be covered. On the other hand, more operations might in fact be covered through supplier extensions within agreements. The number is therefore a suggestion, and it is significant given the total number of GFAs existing, and the number of workers potentially included.

The analysis below has in the main been restricted to issues that are felt to be important to the African trade unions and regional GUFs in Africa. It draws on the more general analysis of Papadakis (2008) and Fichter, Helfen, Sydow (2010) and I refer readers to their tables for a discussion of core contents of GFA generally and to Appendix 5 for the full tables of GFAs included here.

¹⁷ As noted in the introduction, there is no absolute agreement on the number of agreements signed, neither in the literature or on the websites. This may be due to the limitations of scope put on some agreements disqualifying them from certain lists that apply such criteria. The issue may be more pragmatic in that not all lists are updated on a day to day basis. This number is drawn from the 2010 study by Fichter et al with a further agreement added following the signing of the GFA between GDF Suez and BWI, ICEM and PSI in November 2010.

OVERVIEW OF SOURCE:

Seven of the GUFs have signed, either singly or jointly, GFAs with MNCs doing business in Africa. UNI, has signed 18, the IMF 15 (one as a joint signatory with the ICEM), ICEM ten (four jointly with PSI, IMF, BWI and one with BWI and PSI together), BWI seven (one with ICEM and one with ICEM and PSI jointly), IUF four, PSI two (one with ICEM and one with ICEM and BWI) and ITGLWF one agreement.

In keeping with the global trend, although some of the agreements were signed in the 1990s, the majority of them have been signed since 2002 with companies originating for the most part in Europe¹⁸ although agreements have also been signed with MNCs originating in Russia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and South Africa. When the UPU (Universal Postal Union – the postal service of the United Nations) GFA is included, nearly every country in Africa is to some extent linked to a GFA. Those hosting the most operations of MNCs that have signed GFAs are South Africa (35), Egypt (19), Algeria (10), Morocco (19), Libya (7), Tunisia (11), Tanzania (7), Nigeria (8), Ghana (9) and Kenya (7).

OVERVIEW OF CONTENT:

CORE CONVENTIONS

Although considered central to GFAs, it is noted that not all the GFAs analysed make specific reference to the four core ILO conventions. Where they do not, reference is generally made as agreements refer to being ‘...oriented at the conventions of the ILO...’ (Leoni) or to a commitment to ‘... [o]bserve and safeguard generally accepted core labour standards of the ILO as well as human rights...’ (Rheinmetall) and in most cases the rights established in the conventions are mentioned although the conventions themselves may not be explicitly named. The table below lists the core conventions covered and to other practices that are referenced in the agreements:

¹⁸ Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom

CONVENTIONS AND PRINCIPLES INCLUDED IN GFAs with MNCs in AFRICA

MNC	Parties to agreement	ILO Conventions *(P)	Employment (P)	Wages (P)	Working Time (P)	Health & Safety (P)	Training (P)	Restructuring (P)
GDF Suez	Company and GUFs (BWI, PSI, ICEM)	87, 98, 100, 102, 111, 135, 155, 167	Yes			Yes	Yes	
Impreglio	Company, Home country union federations (Feneal-UIL, Filca-CISL, Fillea-CGIL) and GUF (BWI)	1, 29, 47, 87, 94, 95, 98, 100, 105, 111, 131, 135, 138, 155, 161, 162, 167, 182; Rec. 116, Rec. 143	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Italcementi	Company and GUF (BWI)	29, 87, 94, 95, 98, 100, 102, 105, 111, 131, 135, 138, 155, 167, 182, Rec. 143	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Lafarge	Company and GUFs (BWI, ICEM, WFBW)	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 155, 182		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Royal BAM	Company and GUF (BWI)	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 155, 167, 182; Rec. 143		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Staedtler	Company, GUF (BWI)and Home Country Union, (IG METALL)	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 155, 182, Rec. 143	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Wilkhahn	Company, GUF (BWI)	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 155, Rec. 143	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
AngloGold Ashanti	Company and GUF (ICEM)	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138, 182				Yes		
EDF	Company, 16 national unions, Asia confederations,, EWC, GUFs (ICEM, ISP, OIEM, FMTI)	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 182		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Freudenberg	Company, GUF (ICEM), Home country Union (IG BCE)	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138				Yes		Yes
Lukoil	Company Home Country union (ROGWU) and GUF (ICEM)	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138, 156, 182		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
RAG->Evonik	Company, GUF (ICEM) and Home TU (IG BCE)	"The social rights and principles... orientated according to the relevant treaties and conventions of the ILO"		Yes	Yes	Yes		
SCA	Company, EWC, GUF, Home country union (Pappers)	"principles derived from the ILO Declaration...(core conventions)"	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
StatoilHydro	Company, GUF (ICEM), Home country Union (Industri Energi - central bargaining union for StatoilHydro in Norway and on behalf of ICEM)	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138		Yes		Yes	Yes	
Umicore	Company, GUFs (ICEM and IMF) and affiliated TU Federations (ACVI, ABVV, ACLVB) Co-signatories	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 182; Rec. 143	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	
Aker ASA	Company, GUF (IMF), Fellesforbundet - Norwegian United Federation of Trade Unions	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 182; Rec. 143	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
ArcelorMittal	Company, IMF, EMF, (EWC involved)	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138, 182				Yes	yes	Yes
BMW	Company, EWC, GUF	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138, 182		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Bosch	Company, EWC (Europa Committee of Bosch), GUF	"Following principles take their lead from the basic labour standards of the ILO"; 98, 100, 138, 182		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
DaimlerChrysler	Company, EWC on behalf of GUF	"Principles oriented at the Conventions of the ILO"		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
EADS NV	Company, EWC, (IMF, EMF associated parties)	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 182			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GEA	Company, EWC, (Joined on the day - GUF, EMF(European), IMF)	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138, 182	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Leoni	Company, EWC, GUF	87, 98, "oriented towards relevant UN Conventions of ILO"		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Prym	Company, GUF (IMF), EWC	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138, 182		Yes	Yes	Yes		
Renault	Company, GUF (IMF), GWC	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Rheinmetall	Company, EWC, IMF, EMF (EMF and IMF join at time of signing)	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138, 182		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
SKF	Company, EWC representing IMF, EMF	138		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Vallourec	Company, GUF, EWC	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138, 182	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	
Volkswagen	Company, GUF (IMF) Group Global Works Council	"Take the ILO Conventions concerned into consideration"		Yes	Yes	Yes		
Inditex	Company, GUF, (Spanish unions and European Federation)	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 155, 159; Rec. 143, Rec. 190	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Accor	Company, GUF (IUF)	87, 98, 135						
Club Med*	Group, GUF (IUF, EFFAT - IUF's European regional organisation represented Club Med's European Social Dialogue committee)	"The principles set out in the ILO Conventions"	Yes					
Danone	Company, EWC, GUF (IUF)	87, 98, 135	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fonterra	Company, GUF (IUF), Home Country Union (New Zealand Dairy Workers Union), ILO, Prime Minister of New Zealand	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 135, 138, 182				Yes		Yes
Carrefour	Company, GUF (UNI)	87, 98, 135,"Carrefour has also condemned child labour in order to prevent slavery and forced labour"						

MNC	Parties to agreement	ILO Conventions (P)	Employment (P)	Wages (P)	Working Time (P)	Health & Safety (P)	Training (P)	Restructuring (P)
Falck	Company, GUF (UNI) Through WWC	This agreement establishes a World Works Council in accordance with Art. 13 EWC directive						Yes
France Telecom Group	Company, GUF (UNI), Home country unions	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138, 182		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
G4S	Group, GUF, Home Country Union (GMB)	29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138, 182	Yes					
Metro	Unsigned statement	"Respect the right to collective bargaining and employees' freedom of association within the scope of national rights and laws. Metro Group ensures that employees, who have decided to become members of a union, are not dismissed or in any other way disadvantaged as a result of their union membership".						
Nampak	Company, GUF (UNI)	87, 98, 100, 105, 135, 155, 182; Rec. 143	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Portugal Telecom	Company, GUF (UNI), Home country unions	1, 29, 47, 87, 94, 95, 98, 100, 105, 111, 131, 135, 138, 155, 167, 182; Rec. 116, Rec. 143	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Securitas	Company, GUF, Home nation union (Swedish Transport Workers Union)	"Draws on the ILO's fundamental principles on rights at work"		Yes	Yes	Yes		
Shoprite	Company, GUF, Home union as witnesses only	"... subscribe to basic rights in the workplace as contemplated under the ILO's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work..."	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Telefonica	Company, GUF, Home unions	1, 29, 47, 87, 94, 95, 98, 100, 105, 111, 131, 135, 138, 155, 182; Rec. 116	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Universal Postal Union (UN)	Company, GUF (UNI)	This agreement establishes cooperation to promote social dialogue.			Yes	Yes	Yes	
Ciett	Company, Group company, group companies	"Recognition of the Fundamental principles and Rights at work..."181; Rec. 188						

(P) From Papadakis 2008 where the agreements are covered, otherwise LRS

* Full text of agreement not available - analysis from statement

**For descriptions of these core conventions, refer to Appendix 1

While there is a list that includes Barclays Africa in its GFA agreements, this agreement cannot be included in the list as it could not be obtained for this analysis.

SCOPE (SEE APPENDIX FIVE TABLE ONE)

While many of the agreements still commit to enforcing the principles only where the Group has operational control, some later GFAs are going further including contractors and sub-contractors in at least some of the commitments of the agreements. The latest agreement signed by three GUFs and GDF Suez in late 2010 contains a clause specifically dealing with workers under sub-contractors and their rights, noting that

GDF SUEZ and all sub-contractors shall take full responsibility for all work being performed under the appropriate legal framework and, in particular, shall not seek to avoid obligations of the employer to dependent workers by disguising what would otherwise be an employment relationship or through the excessive use of temporary or agency labour. (GDF Suez GFA, 2010)

LOCAL LAW (SEE APPENDIX FIVE TABLE THREE)

As referenced above, the G4S agreement makes the strongest statement for the subordination of ILO conventions to local conditions. Siting competitiveness in the industry it further states that while the GUF and the company shall work together if G4S start losing market share to monitor and raise standards among all companies in market so that G4S can raise standards without compromising its competitive position, if this does not stop G4S from losing market share then 'the union rights under this agreement which go beyond legal requirements may be suspended at local level until such time as the issue is resolved.' (G4S GFA, 2008) Other agreements move in the opposite direction, such as the France Telecom GFA which states that '...the commitment to ILO applies also to all countries which have not ratified ILO agreements'. (France Telecom GFA, 2006) There are many agreements in the sample that make no reference to local legislation at all.

IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING (SEE APPENDIX FIVE TABLE FOUR)

Although considered a basic requirement, not all of the agreements include specific details of how the information of the GFA will be communicated to the workforce, management or suppliers, or identifies whose responsibility this is. Dissemination of agreements varies from publishing it on the company website to holding regular meetings with management from all subsidiaries and informing suppliers on the business-to-business websites.

Most agreements do note some kind of implementation/ monitoring process. This varies from an agreement to have a meeting once a year with the GUF and possibly the home union or European Works council, to details of how disputes can be raised through the correct channels from local to international level. Thirteen of the GFAs analysed make some reference to host unions, those from company operations outside the country of origin, having a degree of participation in the annual meetings between the GUF and the company or at other local meetings.

TRAINING (SEE APPENDIX FIVE TABLE FOUR)

Few agreements make reference to a provision of training for union representatives in the terms and processes of the GFA, in the case of the current sample nine make some provision, in the main by giving time and access to the GUF or local union to do so. Fonterra (2002) has committed to cooperation with the GUF and the home union to implement training, although no details are given as to how this will be affected.

5. LITERATURE REVIEW- ISSUES ARISING

While Africa and African trade unions are not dealt with directly in the current GFA reviews analysed here, several matters are raised which do reflect on the relationship African trade unions have with GFAs and with

the Global GUF. What they highlight is gap between the regional experience of trade unions in Africa and the global processes within GUFs and the challenge this poses to GUFs, nationally, regionally and globally.

LEGAL MATTERS

GFA are agreements in principle between GUFs and MNCs, not international legislation. The literature notes some degree of cynicism expressed about how effectively GFAs can be implemented without any formal legal sanction. Particularly in countries with weak labour legislation, and this pertains to many countries in Africa, workers do not believe these agreements have power to compel companies to behave in a certain way. Stevis notes the linked concern expressed that by in effect privatising social rights, GFAs may even take the pressure off international bodies to formalise and legislate for social rights on an international level (2010, p. 1). Defenders note that while they are clearly a compromise to try and fill the gap where legislation has failed, GFAs can and may work and MNCs might in fact deliver rights where they were not before which would be a gain for GUFs at all level (Muller, Platzer, & Rub, 2008, p. 5). While neither of these arguments has been tested empirically and further research should be applied to do so, the objection speaks to a subject that is a recurring criticism of GFAs: the relation of the centre to the periphery, not just of the MNCs but of GUFs.

'PERIPHERY' MATTERS

Stevis puts it as the question of whether GFAs are an emerging form of global social dialogue or an uneven extension of European dialogue across the globe. (Stevis, 2010, p. 1) Are 'periphery' regions being expected to apply arrangements in which their voices have played no part and therefore do not speak to their needs, or is this a perception that nonetheless needs to be addressed?

The question brings into focus the many relationships, noted by Fichter, Helfen and Sydow (2010, p. 6), that are at play within the engagement between a GUF and an MNC and that impact on both the content and implementation of any agreement. They assert that within the MNC there are relationships between the central management and the operations beyond the home country borders which may be either good or bad or somewhere in between and power structures that lie somewhere between centralised and federal. These impact on how much or little the central management gets involved in implementing GFAs in their operations and subsidiaries. Similar vertical relations are identified within the GUF, with strong communication and synergy between the global, regional and national structures in place or a looser, less connected structure, or, in reality, no real structure at all. Then there are the relationships between the GUF and the MNC at various levels. The relationship global GUF with the MNC head office and the operations with the regional and national GUFs (in the form of national affiliates) may take various more or less amicable forms. It is these relationships which translate into how well or with what difficulty GFAs are both negotiated and implemented.

ARE GUFs BEHAVING LIKE MNCs?

Fichter, Helfen and Sydow assert in their analysis that with local unions and local management actors virtually non-existent in GFA negotiations GFAs should be classified as a top-down approach in which global union federations mirror image classical managerial behaviour (2010, p. 23). This criticism, whether true or perceived, has to be addressed.

If it is true, by excluding unions from operations in Africa in the negotiation process and thus in the sharing of information and ideas, GUF headquarters lose the credibility to speak on behalf of them as well as losing out on vital input into the GFA content. As one participant in the GUF Africa focus group noted, and will be returned to later – without consulting African trade unions in these processes, where is their mandate? If it is just a perception, it is seemingly a strongly held one that is limiting solidarity and trust among GUF affiliates. Kaag (2008, p. 6) notes that GFAs are a good thing if the GUF is genuinely able to speak on behalf of the workers, is

well acquainted with the employees' circumstances and is able to put forward concrete cases to international management. None of this is possible if there is weak communication inside the GUF.

Where GFAs have been signed, GUFs sometimes seen as failing workers in the education and training required to implement and monitor them. The BWI notes that despite the fact that GFAs mean nothing if workers covered by them are not informed and educated to use the space and monitor their companies, a survey conducted in 2004 showed that only little information is available at the workplaces and to the trade unions around the world (International Federation of Building and Wood Workers, 2004, p. 5).

6. QUESTIONNAIRES – PERCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

The questionnaires looked at how the different levels of the GUF understood the relevance and uses of GFAs in Africa, and the problems that arise in relation to using them. It further identified how each of the groups understands the roles and responsibilities of the various geographical levels of the GUF in the GFA processes. Questionnaires to GUF national affiliates further dealt with questions of access to the GFA and the GFA processes.

It is noted that African countries show a wide variation amongst themselves when it comes to union organisation and engagement so that answers relating to the whole of Africa, as submitted by Global and Regional GUFs, do not necessarily apply to all African trade unions in the various contexts in which they operate. Responses were submitted on a guarantee of anonymous reporting and are thus not analysed on a named basis.

In the text and tables below, “Global” refers to responses from GUF head office, “Regional” to those from Africa regional representative offices and “National” from national GUF affiliates, the trade unions.

THE PLACE OF GFAs IN THE STRATEGIES AND ENGAGEMENTS OF NATIONAL TRADE UNIONS

According to the responses, all levels of the GUF view GFAs as at relevant to African trade unions. That is, that they speak to the needs and issues that member unions experience. However, while all of the Global GUFs see GFAs as relevant to Africa, half of the regional GUFs and six of the ten national GUFs (one did not complete the question) see them as very relevant. This is perhaps because GFAs do provide, in their principles, minimum protections to workers that are otherwise absent in some African countries, protections that are seen as very relevant in Africa.

How relevant are GFAs to African trade unions?	GLOBAL	REGIONAL	NATIONAL
Very relevant	0%	50%	60%
Relevant	100%	50%	40%
Not relevant	0%	0%	0%

A slightly different question addressed the usefulness of GFAs to African affiliates. That is, given that they are relevant to African trade unions, how many of the unions have been able to use the space provided by the GFA to assist them. Contrary to the view that African trade unions cannot use the GFAs, no respondent felt that GFAs were not useful in Africa, both the regional offices and the national unions again noted most if not all unions did use the agreements in some way.

How many of your affiliated African trade unions find GFAs useful?	GLOBAL	REGIONAL	NATIONAL
All of them	0%	17%	

Most of them	33%	50%
Few of them	67%	33%
None of them	0%	0%
Does your union find GFAs useful?		
Very useful		73%
Useful		27%
Not useful		0%

Concerning what use the agreements had been to unions there is some disparity between the responses of national affiliates and those of the regional and global GUFs. This may be down to the fact that the GUF experience of uses of the GFAs in Africa may not relate to the same national unions as responded to the questionnaire. Nonetheless, except for one trade union, all responses show that GFAs have in some way been useful to national trade unions in Africa. In the case of that trade unions also, comments show that while a GFA may not yet have been used, it is on the agenda of the union and plans for incorporating the GFA into trade union strategies are under consideration. Priorities given did differ between levels of the GUF with global head offices and national unions highlighting GFAs as most useful in collective bargaining negotiations while African GUF offices indicated that they were most useful for recruiting new members. This does not necessarily highlight a disagreement between the levels of the GUF as the uses to which the regional GUF office puts the GFA will more often be around recruiting rather than collective bargaining and may indicate their higher level of involvement in these activities. Both areas of the highest response indicate that it is around the core ILO principles that African trade unions are most able to use the space provided by GFAs.

How have GUF affiliates in Africa (national trade unions) used the GFAs signed by the GUF in their engagements with companies or as organising tools?	GLOBAL	REGIONAL	NATIONAL
Campaigning around issues	67%	67%	18%
Recruitment of new members	67%	83%	36%
Collective bargaining negotiations	100%	33%	82%
Cross-border solidarity with other trade unions in the company	33%	50%	36%
Dispute settlement	0%	50%	18%
The GFAs have not been used by the unions	0%	0%	18%

ISSUES OF IMPLEMENTATION

From the answers offered, there was a wide spread of issues highlighted as impeding the implementation of the GFAs in African countries.

What, if any, have been the problems with GFAs being used by African trade unions?	GLOBAL	REGIONAL	NATIONAL
Lack of communication between the GUF and unions	0%	50%	36%
Lack of capacity within the unions to engage with the GFA	67%	50%	55%

Political context in which the unions operate	33%	67%	9%
Company attitude in engaging with the unions	33%	83%	55%

While the answers are diverse, it is noted that none of the global GUFs consider communication between levels of the GUF a problem; however, it did register as an issue for both regional GUFs and national affiliates. In comment both regional GUFs and national affiliates note that agreements are seldom communicated with the national affiliates so that in some cases unions are not even aware of their existence. Issues of communication may not be that there is no attempt to communicate with national unions but that the methods employed, such as posting agreements on the GUF website, are not appropriate in Africa where many unions, let alone members, do not have access to the internet. This may highlight a certain lack of understanding at a global level for the context in which African national affiliates find themselves, but it certainly points to a need to rethink communication strategies or assisting unions to become more internet active.

A strong response across the submissions indicates a lack of capacity within unions to engage with the GFA. This may be as the result of the lack of communication, as indicated in the first response or to weak unions in general that are unable to organise around the issues. It could also, as noted above, indicate the difference in relationship between the MNC and home and host unions as well as the different legislative and political environments in which host country unions operate. One response from a national union notes how the union finds ‘it difficult to implement some of the GFAs because of the arrogant employers and unstable political environment’. A further comment highlights that while head office and even regional GUFs are thinking globally, this notion has not been shared properly with affiliates many of whom still operate and strategise on a purely national level and are unwilling or unable to be part of the global movement. Such responses point to the strong need to inform and educate affiliates on the nature and reach of many of the companies in which their members work so that affiliates are motivated to become part of regional and also global networks, seeing the gains in engaging on a greater level.

WHAT WOULD HELP MAKE IT MORE USEFUL IN AFRICA?

The question, posed in all questionnaires, brought out responses that dealt in the main with issues of communication and engagement, training and information sharing.

At a regional level there is a call for more engagement of African GUF offices and African national affiliates in the initial campaigning and negotiations of GFAs so that affiliates become fully aware of the global context in which they work, and have input into the processes and content of the GFAs. Regional offices in particular asked for more engagement when it comes to signing agreements with MNCs active in Africa.

Early engagement with the process is one way to increase awareness of GFAs but regional GUFs also note the need for *‘an effective means to communicate these agreements to affiliates as soon as they are signed. This should be followed up with education and training programmes to assist affiliates in how to effectively use agreements to the benefits of members’*.

National unions in Africa likewise call for greater efforts at communication to all rank and file members of the unions through workshops and seminars. Further, two responses stress the need for training and education even at the top levels of African trade unions where familiarity concerning GFAs is acknowledged as slim.

Further calls are also made for stronger relationships between unions within an MNC but more particularly with the ‘union in the mother company’. It is significant that where a GFA has been signed by an African MNC,

there is evidence of much stronger ties, levels of assistance and networking across the company in Africa. There were also calls for greater networking not just within but between GUFs to share experiences and assist in areas of common interest.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The view from all levels of the GUF places the weight of responsibility on the Global GUF to facilitate the implementation of the GFAs in Africa. Roles become less clear at a regional and national level, although again, this will differ depending on the GUF and its strategic objectives, some GUFs being more centrally managed than others which devolve more responsibility to regional offices. While acknowledging this, it is evident that in many cases the responsibilities are seen as shared among all levels of the GUF. What is not clear from broad responses is if this is due to a strategy of delegation or a lack of clarity concerning each levels roles and responsibilities.

While respondents seem to agree that global and regional GUFs should be monitoring the GFA implementation, far fewer national affiliates saw this as a national affiliate level responsibility. This is contrary to written opinion which states that the members in local unions are in fact the best monitors of a GFA since they are present in the operations of the MNCs wherever they occur. A comment from one of the national affiliates notes that *'...The union's role is limited as it is not adequately briefed about the activity of the GUF affiliates in Africa about signing and implementing the GFA'*. This comment may indicate a feeling not that unions are unwilling to participate as monitors of the GFAs but that up until now they feel they lack the information, education and therefore the capacity to do so.

It is also noted that none of the Global responses indicated a role for regional GUFs in negotiations with companies on signing GFAs, a role for which the regional GUF responses indicate they would very much like. More than half of the regional respondents commented to the effect that the regional offices have *'not been involved in issues pertaining to either signing or implementation of framework agreements. This means that the issues are only discussed and implemented at the international level but that it does not trickle down to the regional level.'*

What is the role of the GUF in assisting affiliated African trade unions in implementing GFAs?	GLOBAL	REGIONAL	NATIONAL
Communicating the GFA agreement to national unions	100%	100%	82%
Training trade union representatives to implement the GFA	100%	100%	73%
Monitoring the implementation of the GFA	100%	67%	82%
Dealing with disputes between company and unions with regard to the GFA	100%	83%	45%

What is the role of GUF Africa offices in signing and implementing GFAs in Africa?	GLOBAL	REGIONAL	NATIONAL
Consulting with national unions on GFA campaign agenda, company targeting	67%	67%	55%
Negotiations with company on signing GFAs	0%	17%	27%

Coordinating national / regional GFA campaigns	67%	67%	55%
Communicating GFA content to national unions	33%	83%	27%
Training trade union representatives on GFA implementation	67%	83%	55%
Monitoring the implementation of the GFA	67%	67%	45%
Dealing with disputes between company and national unions with regard to the GFA	67%	33%	36%

What is the role of GUF affiliates in Africa (national trade unions) in signing and implementing GFAs?	GLOBAL	REGIONAL	NATIONAL
Campaigning in their countries for GFAs	67%	50%	55%
Communicating GFA principles to union members	100%	67%	64%
Monitoring the implementation of the GFA	100%	67%	36%
No specified role	0%	0%	9%

7. GFA FOCUS GROUP¹⁹

A focus group concerning the implementation of GFAs in Africa and the successes and issues faced was hosted by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) on 16 November 2010. In attendance were senior representatives of the continental structures of the GUFs (referred to in this report as Africa GUFs) – BWI, ITGLWF, PSI, IUF, UNI, ICEM and IMF. There were also representatives of the national unions from South Africa that signed GFAs with SA corporations – South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU) and National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), as well as a representative of the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (NUMSA), which represents workers at subsidiaries of European multinational corporations in the automobile sector, that signed GFAs. The group discussed some of the outcomes of the research but focussed on participants own experiences of implementing GFAs through their GUF structures and the challenges they faced. GUF structures and aims were noted as differing depending on the sectors, companies and geographical areas in which they were engaging.

Participants reflected on their general experiences with GFAs. One view saw GFAs as useful instruments of promoting social dialogue and of preventing a race to the bottom. By promoting minimum labour and social standards the agreements are seen to ensure that corporations do not raise their levels of profitability and competitiveness by operating below the minimum standards. Another view appreciated the evolution of GFAs over time – they started as mere statements of intent and then improved and progressed over time to embrace the core labour standards of the ILO, together with better enforcement mechanisms.

Participants described how GFAs signed particularly with South African MNCs have been used to gain organising rights in other African countries (AngloGold Ashanti) and have been used in solidarity campaigns with trade unions in ‘periphery’ operations such as the UK (Nampak).

¹⁹ This section draws on the focus group report drafted by Bethuel Maserumule of the FES, with gratitude.

EXPECTATIONS

There was general agreement that GFAs main aim is to monitor the behaviour of MNCs as they grow and that this takes place through monitoring the levels and strengths of unionisation within those MNCs as well as the nature of employment at MNCs, their investment in skills development and training. Discussion focussed on how GUFs can use GFAs to place demands on MNCs to respect the commitments within the agreements and allow for organising. It was highlighted that GFAs in Africa are expected to assist Africa GUFs to help workers form unions in countries that have little to no experience of democratic unionisation and to deal with those challenges as MNCs push into new areas such as the DRC and Guinea.

LIMITATIONS

The ability of Africa GUFs and national affiliates to implement and monitor GFAs was felt to be frustrated by the processes through which GFAs are reached. The focus group generally expressed the perception that African unions are at the mercy of the employer and the European (home) union when it comes to GFAs. As noted before, GFAs have often arisen not out of global campaigns but out of the relationship between the home union and the company (International Textile Garment and Leather Workers Federation). A strong feeling was voiced around the table that Europeans seem to negotiate GFAs on behalf of themselves only, with little regard to how (a) the content (b) the processes impact on African trade unions. The problems that African GUFs encounter in this regard to some degree echo those noted in the literature in that some GFAs do not sufficiently address the pressing organising needs of African trade unions and focus too strongly on what are seen second degree issues that rely on the strong relationships the home unions share with the MNC headquarters and cannot be implemented in Africa; that they ignore the context in which African trade unions operate when dealing with local legislation, forms of employment, local management attitude and low levels of trade union organisation. In the worst case some GFAs are seen to be written in such a way that they seem to actively undermine African GUF affiliates. The case of SATAWU and the G4S agreement was cited in this regard. In this instance SATAWU has apparently been blocked from organising at G4S as the company already has a recognition agreement with a non-affiliated union. G4S is apparently blocking SATAWU on the basis of the following condition in the agreement (2008):

In general, UNI unions will not request recognition under this process where there is pre-existing recognition of a legitimate and representative non-UNI union, Exceptions, including where multiple unions is the normal practice, can be discussed at the Review Meeting.

It was noted at the focus group that had South African unions been included in the process of drawing up the agreement, such a clause would not have been included in the agreement.

The issue raised by participants was one of mandate. Participants felt that their members have not been asked for a mandate for the agreements that are signed on their behalf and are then expected to implement and monitor. If they had been consulted African unions would have given some input into the content and processes of the GFA as well as being better equipped to monitor them. The tasks of using the GFA for any purpose is made that much more difficult when the process is opaque to workers who are expected to rely on the rights it grants when they are organising and increases the scepticism of workers who, if they are even aware that they are covered by a GFA, and know what a GFA is, mistrust the GFAs ability to hold the company to account.

Linked to this issue of greater communication and engagement from above is the need for democratisation among national affiliates themselves. Participants expressed frustration in working with trade unions where

information, education and engagement do not get beyond leadership level to an engagement with shop stewards and company workers themselves. In too many situations only the leaders are ever party to meetings and processes and do not share the information and training with members.

Participants noted that GUFs need to acknowledge some of the affiliate unions are not democratic unions and that these unions cannot and will not participate usefully in the GFA organising and campaigning process but that these needed to be differentiated from weak unions that need assistance, training, and a sharing of skills through the space created by the principles of the GFA. Only in this way will they be able to deal with what is perceived as unsupportive national legislation and political structures and hostile local management.

One of the reasons unions find it difficult to organise in Africa, even with the space of the GFA is the fact of new forms of employment at companies and the informalisation of labour in Africa, making for a highly mobile work force that is increasingly difficult to organise.

Finally the language barrier and the difficulties of

working in Anglophone, Francophone, Arabic and Lusophone countries and the difficulties of forming networks with people who can communicate only with difficulty. This issue was already noted in connection with the questionnaire.

While none of the participants felt that these limitations were enough to discard GFAs as a tool, there was a feeling that other mechanisms, smaller, regional agreements, agreements on certain pressing issues, getting companies to sign on to other conventions such as the Global Compact and the OECD guidelines must also be explored in addition to GFAs. Further, in some GUFs it has been decided that until a certain level of union organisation has been reached within MNC operations, the chances of the GFA having any impact are slim and so organising strategies and plans are being undertaken prior to any campaigns for GFAs to give a better chance of a strong GFA with good implementation being signed.

8. KEY FINDINGS

The research suggests three key areas of work that need to be investigated:

1. Perceptions

The perception that African GUFs and African unions are not included in the GFA processes has come out in both the literature and consultation with questionnaire and focus group participants. In the literature, commentators suggest that the GFA is a top-down process with little involvement outside home unions and GUFs. Research participants feel that Africans are excluded and therefore ill-equipped to implement the agreements of which they are a part. Whether this perception is real or imagined will require further research to confirm. However, the perception itself speaks to a need for more efficient and on-going communication between the all levels of the GUF.

2. Expectations

Expectations of the GFA, while they are generally agreed, are specifically varied. The space that is expected of GFAs as both monitoring and organising tools may be overestimated. As an example, national unions and regional GUFs express the frustration that GFAs do not do more to overcome the local problems they face with legislation and management in their attempts to organise workers. However, while local legislation may be weak, a GFA does at least commit MNCs to respect these local minimums where before they may not have been compelled to. This is the space they have created.

Perhaps it is too small but perhaps, in holding MNCS to these minimum commitments unions and GUFs can begin to increase the space for further campaigning.

3. Both of the above findings speak to the need for capacity building within local unions. Responses, particularly to the questionnaires point to local unions that may be unaware global context in which they are operating as well as the space created by GFAs, small though it may be, to organise and how this can be done. This is indicated in both the comments of participants and also suspected as a reason for the low response rate of local unions to the questionnaires. Capacity needs to be built both at the leadership and membership level so that unions are able to use the GFA commitments to organise and campaign for improvements that are not, in themselves, included in the GFA, such as improvements in conditions beyond what local legislation requires.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ORGANISING – USING THE SPACE CREATED

Education:

The spaces opened by GFAs may be small now, but they do exist and continue to be opened through further MNCS, including those from the south, signing GFAs. As this happens education and communication are critical so that information can continuously flow from the both the Global GUF to the local affiliates and the other way around, from members through their unions to the global level so that workers can use the information to analyse their own situations and develop campaigns and programmes to improve their situations and build solidarity.

KNOW YOUR GFA, YOUR COMPANY AND SECTOR, KNOW YOUR UNIONS

- It should be a priority among GUFs to educate local unions on what GFAs are and what they do. Where a GFA is being negotiated or has been signed with specific MNC, information on the terms of that GFA must be shared so that local unions know the spaces that they have to work with.
- Linked to this is that African GUFs and unions need to know the companies with whom they are engaging so that they can identify and exploit the spaces for organising and campaigning within that MNC. Further, information brings into focus the particular issues that African workers face and can feed into the input that Africa GUFs should campaign for in GFA negotiations. Stronger arguments from Africa, based on timely and strategic information, are likely to carry more weight when conditions for the GFA are being negotiated. Regularly updated company information can therefore be used both to campaign for GFAs and also to evaluate and monitor the impact of GFAs already signed. It capacitates unionists to carry out their responsibilities with relation to monitoring so that the roles, responsibilities and power are not always referred back to the HQ of the GUF but owned by the workers.

Information on the sector in which the African GUF and unions are operating can help to identify trends and assist in strategizing and linking with other unions organising in the sector.

- Further, knowing the operational reach of the MNC can help to identify other unions in the region with whom communication can be opened and networks formed. Information on companies and sectors includes information on where the workers are in these operations and what unions are present there, their level of organisation and the state of their relationship with the company. This begins the process of knowing the unions which is carried forward below.

KNOW YOUR UNIONS - MONITORING UNION ORGANISATION

The GFA becomes a more powerful tool if it is monitored not just for possible infringements of core conventions by the MNCs, but for positive developments in union organisation. Africa GUFs and national unions need tools and training through which levels of unionisation can be monitored. These could be developed and distributed throughout the unions in the MNC structure, with reports collected by the Africa GUF for analysis of progress. Questionnaires such as that included in Appendix Four, developed from a prototype created for the Shoprite engagement with UNI, can be distributed to unions across the company to collect and collate information on the situation of unions in those operations. The tool can be administered by workers in the company thus drawing them into the engagement and raising awareness at the shop floor. This information provides a starting point for strategic engagement with the company and for discussions with the Global GUF. Updated on an annual basis this information will show any improvement and trends in union organisation and provides a picture of where progress is being made or stifled.

Communication:

Communication is clearly central to any campaigning and education. It begins with knowing where the affiliated unions are and having access to the contact details of key members within that union, not just the leadership but on the shop floor of operations. Through communication of information and experiences within a company alliances networks can be built where members can support each other in their campaigns and organising engagements.

The value of sharing information about the company is evident. However communication is on-going process and benefits from more frequent communication than research reports from company documents. Information about the company in the form of news comes in an almost continual stream from around its operations and it is recommended that affiliates track the news about MNCs in their country and share it in emails through the network. This builds solidarity and keeps alliance affiliates constantly aware of the MNC operations within and beyond their own borders, highlighting where perhaps other members require solidarity in difficult times and instances where affiliates have succeeded in achieving better conditions.

SHARING OF SKILLS

Capacity building on working with information on company financials, wages and conditions, the process of collective bargaining and reporting skills allows shop stewards to take a greater role in strategizing and to share this information with members.

MANDATING – DEMOCRATISING THE GUF

GUF HQs must get a mandate from African trade unions for the agreements made in their name and African trade union leaders require a mandate from their workers in order to pass this on. The communication

channels therefore have to be opened in both directions - from the national unions up to GUF HQ and from national union leadership to the shop floor workers of the MNCs.

SHOP STEWARDS COUNCILS

The process of mandating is facilitated through the election of a National Shop Stewards' Council which should be regarded as a priority for organising. These councils, made up of shop stewards who are elected by members in regularised elections is central to organising in a particular country and further in aiming to deepen the regional network as these elected representatives will finally be on the Continental Shop Stewards Council. Moving to a national council is therefore an important step in democratising the unions and the GUF through fully elected and representative council of shop stewards for Africa and in time perhaps beyond.

PREPARING FOR THE GFA "DISCUSSION FORUMS"

Apart from the above strategies which all feed into preparations for the GFA 'dialogues' there must be some focus on planning for these meetings. The first step is to understand the global framework agreement and the opportunities it offers as well as its limitations. Given this understanding by national affiliates, objectives for this meeting should be set so that they can be met through activities and campaigns in the intervening time. These may include national activities, negotiations nationally with new demands put on the table, and industrial action. It is essential that there is a momentum around these meetings so that real work is done in the engagement. While the global GUF will table proposals coming from national unions to management, it is sure to encounter resistance and inflexibility from the MNC and mobilisation of affiliates in preparation for these meeting is key to any success.

CONCLUSION

As a tool for working towards global solidarity GFAs are the beginning, not the end, of the engagement with MNCs. Their purpose is to open the space for organising and for dialogue where perhaps none existed before. As with all negotiated settlements, GFAs are a compromise between the MNC and the GUF and therefore have limitations. Some of these limitations are real and have to be confronted; others may be based on perceptions which can be dealt with through greater levels of communication and education. Whether the limitations are in the end too great to make GFAs useful can only be decided once there has been proper engagement with the processes and it may be some time before this can be evaluated. What this research has found is that some gains have been made using these agreements for organising, recruitment and collective bargaining and there is an enthusiasm for and belief in their usefulness which should be further explored.

While the strongest unions may be those in Europe, pressing global issues including poverty, resources and migration are experienced very intensely in Africa by African workers. The developing presence of GUFs in Africa is therefore vital for their own global relevance and the voice of African unions, whether through GFAs or other mechanisms, can only benefit GUFs and increase their power and relevance in social dialogue institutions and forums.

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APPENDIX ONE – ILO CORE CONVENTIONS CITED IN GLOBAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS

The four ILO core conventions are:

A - The prohibition of child labour:

- 138 - Minimum Age Convention, 1973
- 182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999

B - Prohibition of forced labour:

- 29 - Forced Labour Convention, 1930
- 105 - Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957

C - Equal treatment or “non-discrimination”

- 100 - Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, 1951
- 111 - Discrimination (Employment & Occupation) Convention, 1958

D - Respect for union and employee’s representatives rights including collective bargaining

- 87 - Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948
- 98 - Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949

Other ILO conventions included in GFAs dealing with general employment and labour conditions: (Papadakis 2008)

- C1 Convention Limiting the Hours of Work in Industrial Undertakings to Eight in the Day and Forty-eight in the Week, 1919.
- C47 Convention concerning the Reduction of Hours of Work to Forty a Week, 1935.
- C94 Convention concerning Labour Clauses in Public Contracts, 1949
- C95 Convention concerning the Protection of Wages, 1949.
- R116 Recommendation concerning Reduction of Hours of Work, 1962
- C131 Convention concerning Minimum Wage Fixing, with Special Reference to Developing Countries, 1970.
- C135 Convention concerning Protection and Facilities to be Afforded to Workers' Representatives in the Undertaking, 1971.
- C155 Convention concerning Occupational Safety and Health and the Working Environment, 1981.
- C156 Convention concerning Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment for Men and Women Workers: Workers with Family Responsibilities, 1981.
- C159 Convention concerning Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons), 1983.
- C161 Convention concerning Occupational Health Services, 1985.
- C162 Convention concerning Safety in the Use of Asbestos, 1986.
- C167 Convention concerning Safety and Health in Construction, 1988.
- C181 Convention concerning Private Employment Agencies, 1997
- R143 Recommendation concerning Protection and Facilities to be Afforded to Workers' Representatives in the Undertaking, 1971.
- R188 Recommendation on private employment agencies, 1997
- R190 Recommendation concerning the prohibition and immediate action for the elimination of the worst forms of child labour, 1999.

APPENDIX TWO - QUESTIONNAIRES TO GLOBAL UNION FEDERATION HQ AND AFRICAN REPRESENTATIVES

GLOBAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS IN AFRICA

A short survey on the relevance of and issues in implementing Global Framework Agreements in Africa
1. Please complete your contact information below.
Name:
Global Union:
Position in GUF:
Address:
City:
Postal Code
Country
Cell phone number:
Other phone number:
Email Address:

2. How have GUF affiliates in Africa (national trade unions) used the GFAs signed by the GUF in their engagements with companies or as organising tools? (Please tick all answers that apply)
a. Campaigning around issues
b. Recruitment of new members
c. Collective bargaining negotiations
d. Cross-border solidarity with other trade unions in the company
e. Dispute settlement
f. The GFAs have not been used by the unions
g. Other (please specify)

3. What is the role of GUF affiliates in Africa (national trade unions) in signing and implementing GFAs? (Please tick all answers that apply)
a. Campaigning in their countries for GFAs\
b. Communicating GFA principles to union members
c. Monitoring the implementation of the GFA
d. Maintaining regional / global trade union networks within companies
e. No specified role f. Other (please specify)

4. What, if any, have been the problems with GFAs being used by African trade unions? (Please tick all answers that apply)
a. Lack of communication of between the GUF and unions
b. Lack of capacity within the unions to engage with the GFA
c. Political context in which the unions operate
d. Company attitude in engaging with the unions
e. Other (please specify)

5. What is the role of the GUF in assisting affiliated African trade unions in implementing GFAs? (Please tick all answers that apply)
a. Communicating the GFA agreement to national unions
b. Training trade union representatives to implement the GFA
c. Monitoring the implementation of the GFA
d. Coordinating global trade union networks within companies
e. Dealing with disputes between company and unions with regard to the GFA
f. Other (please specify)

6. What is the role of GUF Africa offices in signing and implementing GFAs in Africa? (Please tick all answers that apply)
a. Consulting with national unions on GFA campaign agenda, company targeting
b. Negotiations with company on signing GFAs
c. Coordinating national / regional GFA campaigns
d. Communicating GFA content to national unions
e. Training trade union representatives on GFA implementation
f. Monitoring the implementation of the GFA
g. Coordinating the trade union company networks among African affiliates
h. Dealing with disputes between company and national unions with regard to the GFA
i. Other (please specify)

7. Are you campaigning for further GFAs that will engage multinationals in Africa?
a. Yes
b. No

8. What would help to make GFAs more useful to affiliated African trade unions?

9. How relevant are GFAs to African trade unions?
a. Very relevant
b. Relevant
c. Not relevant

10. How many of your affiliated African trade unions find GFAs useful?
a. All of them
b. Most of them
c. Few of them
d. None of them

APPENDIX THREE – QUESTIONNAIRE TO AFRICAN GUF AFFILIATES (NATIONAL TRADE UNIONS)

IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS IN AFRICA

A SHORT SURVEY ON THE RELEVANCE OF AND ISSUES IN
IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS (GFAS) IN
AFRICA

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Please complete the short survey and return to the Labour Research Service (South Africa) by email, fax or post to the address below. Contact the LRS at the same address if you have any questions regarding the survey.
2. Even if not all the questions apply to your union, please complete as much as is relevant and return the survey by 20 September 2010.
3. Note that “GUF” refers to “Global Union Federation” and “GFA” to “Global Framework Agreement”

CONTACT DETAILS:



Michelle Taal
Labour Research Service
PO Box 376
Woodstock
7915
South Africa

Tel: +27214471677
Fax: +27214479244
Mobile: +27728955894
Email: michelle@lrs.org.za

A. TRADE UNION CONTACT INFORMATION

Name of Trade Union:

Name of Trade Unionist working on this survey:
Position in Trade Union

Address:
COUNTRY:
Email address (1):
Email address (2):

Telephone:
Work:
Mobile:

TRADE UNION GLOBAL UNION FEDERATION AFFILIATION

Name of Global Union Federation (GUF) to which Trade Union is affiliated (Please circle all that apply)

BWI

IUF

ICEM

PSI

IMF

UNI

ITF

ITGLWF

C. QUESTIONNAIRE

1. How has the union used the Global Framework Agreements (GFAs) signed by the Global Union (GUF) to which it is affiliated in engagements with companies or as organising tools? (please circle all answers that apply)

- a. Campaigning around issues
 - b. Recruitment of new members
 - c. Collective bargaining negotiations
 - d. Cross-border solidarity with other trade unions in the company
 - e. Dispute settlement
 - f. The GFAs have not been used by the union
 - g. Other (please specify)
-

2. What is the union's role as a Global Union affiliate in Africa in signing and implementing GFAs? (please circle all answers that apply)

- a. Campaigning with the company in the country for a GFA
 - b. Communication of GFA principles to union members
 - c. Monitoring the implementation of the GFA in the country
 - d. No specified role
 - e. Other (please specify)
-

3. What, if any, have been the problems for the union in engaging with the GFAs for organising and campaigning? (Please circle all answers that apply)

- a. Lack of communication of between the GUF and the union
 - b. Lack of capacity within the union to engage with the GFA
 - c. Political context in which the union operates
 - d. Company attitude in engaging with the union
 - e. Other (please specify)
-
-

4. What is the role of the GUF in assisting the union to implement GFAs? (Please circle all answers that apply)

- a. Communicating the GFA agreement to the union
- b. Training trade union representatives on implementing the GFA
- c. Monitoring the implementation of the GFA

- d. Dealing with disputes between company and the union with regard to the GFA
- e. Other (please specify)

5. What is the role of GUF Africa office in signing and implementing GFAs in Africa? (Please circle all answers that apply)

- a. Consulting with national union on GFA agenda and company targeting
- b. Negotiating with company on signing GFAs
- c. Coordinating national / regional GFA campaigns
- d. Communicating GFA content to the union
- e. Training union representatives on GFA implementation
- f. Monitoring the implementation of the GFA
- g. Dealing with disputes between company and national union with regard to the GFA
- h. Other (please specify)

6. Are you campaigning for further GFAs that will engage multinationals in Africa?

YES NO

7. What would help to make GFAs more useful to African trade unions?

8. How relevant are GFAs to African trade unions?

- a. Very relevant
- b. Relevant
- c. Not relevant

9. Does your union find GFAs useful?

- a. Very useful
- b. Useful
- c. Not useful

10. Do you have input into the annual meeting and discussion forum between the Global Union and the company in the GFA? (Please circle as applicable)

YES SOME OF THEM NO NOT APPLICABLE

11. Is the union part of a network in the companies with whom you have GFAs? (Please circle as applicable)

YES SOME OF THEM NO NOT APPLICABLE

12. Has a contact person been appointed in the union to monitor the GFA? (Please circle as applicable)

YES SOME OF THEM NO NOT APPLICABLE

D. GLOBAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT INFORMATION

Please list the names of the companies where your trade union is included in Global Framework Agreements

COMPANY	RELATIONSHIP WITH MAIN COMPANY: (PLEASE CIRCLE OR FILL IN APPROPRIATE DESCRIPTOR OF RELATIONSHIP)
	Outlet / Plant / Subsidiary / Subcontractor / Supplier / Other (Please specify)
	Outlet / Plant / Subsidiary / Subcontractor / Supplier / Other (Please specify)

Does the union have copies of the Global Framework Agreements to which it is a party?

YES SOME OF THEM NO NOT APPLICABLE

Please add any additional information you think is important here and on any additional sheets.

APPENDIX FOUR – SAMPLE GFA MONITORING REPORT

“COMPANY X” SHOP STEWARD REPORT

1.

UNION:
COUNTRY:
REPORTING PERIOD:

2.

REPORT COMPILER
NAME:
TELEPHONE NUMBER:
EMAIL ADDRESS:

3.

GENERAL SECRETARY
NAME:
TELEPHONE NUMBER:
EMAIL ADDRESS:

4.

COMPANY DETAILS
NAME:
LOCATION OF OPERATION:

5. “COMPANY X” EMPLOYEES AND UNION MEMBERSHIP

“COMPANY X” EMPLOYEES AND UNION MEMBERSHIP AT OPERATION						
	TOTAL “COMPANY X” EMPLOYEES			UNION MEMBERSHIP		
	PERMANENT	CASUAL	TOTAL	PERMANENT	CASUAL	TOTAL
MALE	A1	B1	C1	A2	B2	C2
FEMALE	D1	E1	F1	D2	E2	F2
TOTAL	G1	H1	I1	G2	H2	I2
TRADE UNION DENSITY AT “COMPANY X” OPERATION						
	PERMANENT		CASUAL	TOTAL		
MALE	A2÷A1x100		B2÷B1x100	C2÷C1x100		
FEMALE	D2÷D1x100		E2÷E1x100	F2÷F1x100		
TOTAL	G2÷G1x100		H2÷H1x100	I2÷I1x100		

5. DO YOU HAVE A RECOGNITION AGREEMENT WITH “COMPANY X”?

YES / NO

6. DO YOU HAVE A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT WITH “COMPANY X”?

YES / NO

IF YES – DATE OF AGREEMENT _____

6a. IF “YES”, LIST YOUR DEMANDS FOR NEGOTIATION

DEMANDS FOR NEGOTIATION		→ATTACH ANY REPORTS
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		

6b. SETTLEMENT →ATTACH AGREEMENT

SETTLEMENT		→ATTACH AGREEMENT
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		

7. DO YOU HAVE A NATIONAL SHOP STEWARD COUNCIL?

YES / NO

7a. IF “YES”, PLEASE LIST NATIONAL SHOP STEWARD COUNCIL MEETINGS →ATTACH REPORT

NATIONAL SHOP STEWARD COUNCIL MEETING				→ATTACH REPORT
DATE	ATTENDANCE			REPORT ATTACHED? (Y/N)
	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	
AGENDA:				

7. OTHER UNION MEETINGS ON “COMPANY X”

→(Please repeat table for each other meeting on a separate sheet)

OTHER UNION MEETINGS ON “COMPANY X”				→ATTACH REPORT
DATE	ATTENDANCE			REPORT ATTACHED? (Y/N)
	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	
AGENDA:				

8. MEETINGS WITH “COMPANY X” MANAGEMENT

→(Please repeat table for each other meeting on a separate sheet)

MEETINGS WITH “COMPANY X” MANAGEMENT				→ATTACH REPORT
DATE	ATTENDANCE			REPORT ATTACHED? (Y/N)
	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	
AGENDA:				
OUTCOMES:				

9. ACTIVITIES TO POPULARISE THE GLOBAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

ACTIVITIES TO POPULARISE GLOBAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT		
DATE	ACTIVITY	IMPACT

10. RECRUITMENT ACTIVITIES

RECRUITMENT ACTIVITIES		
DATE	ACTIVITY	IMPACT

11. BUILDING TRADE UNION UNITY

MEETINGS / ACTIVITIES WITH OTHER UNIONS IN "COMPANY X"			
DATE	OTHER UNION	ACTIVITY	IMPACT / OUTCOME

12. CAPACITY BUILDING / SHOP STEWARD TRAINING

CAPACITY BUILDING / SHOP STEWARD TRAINING		
DATE	ACTIVITY	IMPACT

13. LIST OF ATTACHMENTS:

- 1. _____
- 2. _____
- 3. _____
- 4. _____

SIGNATURE OF REPORT COMPILER: _____

DATE: _____

APPENDIX FIVE - 1. MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES COVERED BY GLOBAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS THAT HAVE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

MNC	GUF	Headquarters	Main Activities (P)	Possible Africa Scope
GDF Suez	BWI / ICEM / PSI	France	Energy & Utilities	Algeria, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Libya, Mauritania, South Africa,
Impreglio	BWI	Italy	Construction	Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, South Africa
Italcementi	BWI	Italy	Construction	Egypt, Gambia, Mauritania, Morocco
Lafarge	BWI / ICEM	France	Construction	Kenya, Morocco, South Africa
Royal BAM	BWI	Netherlands	Construction	Ghana, Libya, Tanzania (Projects also in South Africa, Cameroon)
Staedtler	BWI	Germany	Office, School and Art Supplies	Affiliate - South Africa; Business Partner - Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia
Wilkhahn	BWI	Germany	Furniture manufacture	Morocco, South Africa
AngloGold Ashanti	ICEM	South Africa	Metals & Mining	Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania
EDF	ICEM / PSI	France	Energy & Utilities	Ivory Coast, South Africa
Freudenberg	ICEM	Germany	Industrial & Automotive Manufacturing	South Africa
Lukoil	ICEM	Russia	Energy & Utilities	Algeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana
RAG->Evonik	ICEM	Germany	Metals & Mining	South Africa + 40 employees in North Africa Middle East
SCA	ICEM	Sweden	Paper & Paper Product Packaging	South Africa, Tunisia
StatoilHydro	ICEM	Norway	Energy & Utilities	Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Libya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania
Umicore	ICEM / IMF	Belgium	Metals & Mining	South Africa
Aker ASA	IMF	Norway	Offshore fishing, construction & engineering	Angola, Nigeria, South Africa
ArcelorMittal	IMF	Luxembourg	Steel Production	Algeria, Liberia, Senegal, South Africa
BMW	IMF	Germany	Auto Manufacturing	South Africa
Bosch	IMF	Germany	Auto Parts Manufacturing	South Africa
DaimlerChrysler	IMF	Germany	Auto Manufacturing	South Africa
EADS NV	IMF	Netherlands	Aerospace & Defence	Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, South Africa
GEA	IMF	Germany	Industrial Manufacturing	South Africa
Leoni	IMF	Germany	Industrial & Auto Manufacturing	Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia
Prym	IMF	Germany	Auto Parts Manufacturing	South Africa - Distribution partner only
Renault	IMF	France	Auto Manufacturing	Egypt, South Africa
Rheinmetall	IMF	Germany	Auto Parts Manufacturing	South Africa

MNC	GUF	Headquarters	Main Activities (P)	Possible Africa Scope
SKF	IMF	Sweden	Industrial Manufacturing	Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, French Guiana, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Republic of Congo, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Vallourec	IMF	France	Industrial Manufacturing	Mannesman - Angola, Egypt, Nigeria
Volkswagen	IMF	Germany	Auto Manufacturing	Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Morocco, South Africa, Tunisia
Inditex	ITGLWF	Spain	Apparel Manufacturing & Retail	Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia (stores)
Accor	IUF	France	Lodging	Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, Tunisia
Club Med*	IUF	France	Travel Agencies & Services, Lodging	Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia
Danone	IUF	France	Dairy Products	Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, South Africa, Tunisia
Fonterra	IUF	New Zealand	Dairy Products	JV with Clover in South Africa, Offices, not manufacturing sites - Algeria, Egypt, Mauritius, South Africa
Carrefour	UNI	France	Discount & Variety Retail, Grocery Retail	Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia
Falck	UNI	Denmark	Health Care Services	Nigeria
France Telecom Group	UNI	France	Telecommunications Services	Orange (FT brand) - Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Reunion, Senegal, Tunisia, Uganda
G4S	UNI	United Kingdom	Security Services	Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia
Metro	UNI	Germany	Grocery Retail	Morocco
Nampak	UNI	South Africa	Packaging Manufacturing	Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia
Portugal Telecom	UNI	Portugal	Telecommunications Services	Angola, Cape Verde, Namibia, San Tome et Principe
Securitas	UNI	Sweden	Security Services	Egypt, Morocco, South Africa
Shoprite	UNI	South Africa	Grocery Retail	Angola, Botswana, Ghana, India, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Telefonica	UNI	Spain	Telecommunications Services	Morocco
Universal Postal Union (UN)	UNI	Switzerland	Inter-governmental Organisation	All Africa as member countries
Ciett	UNI	USA	Temporary agency work	Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa, Tunisia

2. TITLE AND SCOPE OF GLOBAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS

MNC	Year	Title	Application
GDF Suez	2010	Global Agreement on Fundamental Rights, Social Dialogue and Sustainable Development	This agreement applies to all present and future GDF Suez companies (fully consolidated within the GDF Suez Group's scope of consolidation and those in which the Group has dominant influence), employees, subcontractors and suppliers.
Impreglio	2004	Framework Agreement between Impreglio and Italian Federations	All company activities
Italcementi	2008	International Framework Agreement to promote workers' rights	All Italcementi Group operations
Lafarge	2005	Agreement on CSR and international industrial relations signed between Lafarge Group and the International trade union federations (FBWW, ICEM and WFBW) to promote and protect workers' rights	Not defined
Royal BAM	2006	Framework Agreement signed between Royal BAM Group NV and BWI to promote and protect workers' rights	Not defined
Staedtler	2006	International Framework Agreement signed between Staedtler, IG Metall Germany and BWI	... obliged to enforce the following principles in its manufacturing and sales companies.
Wilkhahn	2009	International Framework Agreement on Social responsibility and Promotion of Employees Rights	..at its production sites and in its distribution companies.
AngloGold Ashanti	2002	Global Agreement	... operations, wherever situated over which AngloGold Ashanti has direct managerial control
EDF	2005	Agreement of EDF Group CSR	... shall apply to those companies over which EDF Group holds direct control i.e. companies in which EDF owns a majority shareholding, or enjoys a majority of voting rights linked to the stock issues, or appoints over half the members of the directing, executive or supervisory bodies.
Freudenberg	2000	Global Agreement	Worldwide effect - All companies in which is exercises corporate leadership
Lukoil	2004	Global Framework Agreement	...covers all activities and operations where LUKOIL has direct control
RAG->Evonik	2003	Agreement between Rag and IG BCE / ICEM on Cooperative labour relationships and the protection of good working conditions within the Worldwide Business activity of the RAG Group	Worldwide business activities of the RAG Group
SCA	2004	Agreement	All activities where company has direct control
StatoilHydro	1998	Statoil Global Agreement	... all activities where StatoilHydro has direct control
Umicore	2007	Sustainable Development Agreement	All companies in the group in which Umicore has operational control
Aker ASA	2008	Agreement between Fellesforbundet, IMF and Aker SA on an International Framework Agreement for the development of good working relations in companies that are part of Aker.	All companies where Aker ASA is the leading shareholder. Aker ASA will use its shareholder influence to secure compliance with the standards set out in this agreement.

MNC	Year	Title	Application
ArcelorMittal	2005	Worldwide agreement on the principles of Arcelor's Corporate Social Responsibility	... entities over which the Group exercises a dominant interest, be it through direct ownership, financial participation or governance rules. ...those who leave don't have to apply, those who join do
BMW	2005	Joint Declaration on Human Rights and Working Conditions in the BMW Group	BMW Group's corporate activities worldwide.
Bosch	2004	Basic principles of social responsibility at Bosch	... throughout the Bosch Group.
DaimlerChrysler	2002	Social Responsibility Principles of DC	... binding upon DaimlerChrysler throughout the world
EADS NV	2005	International Framework Agreement and EADS and EWC	... wherever group operates insofar as more favourable conditions do not exist already
GEA	2003	Codes of Conduct of GEA AG	... binding within the company throughout the world.
Leoni	2002	Declaration on Social Rights and Industrial Relationships at LEONI	...binding on LEONI worldwide. LEONI will place its executives in the respective countries under the obligation to comply with this declaration.
Prym	2004	Declaration	Not mentioned
Renault	2004	Renault Group Employees' Fundamental Rights Declaration	... employees... wherever they are in the world
Rheinmetall	2003	Social Responsibility Guidelines Code of Conduct of Rheinmetall AG	Binding worldwide and applicable to all companies in the Group in which a Rheinmetall company is in charge of industrial management.
SKF	2003	Code of Conduct	All employees
Vallourec	2008	Agreement on the Principles of Responsibility Applicable within the Vallourec Group	Wherever the Group is located... undertakes to prevent bad practices noted in all works...applicable to all enterprises in which Vallourec has a majority shareholding.
Volkswagen	2002	Declaration on Social Rights and Industrial Relationships at Volkswagen	... for countries and regions represented in the Group Global Works Council
Inditex	2007	International Framework Agreement	...to be applied throughout the Inditex supply chain
Accor	1995	IUF/Accor international trade union rights agreement	All activities of the Accor group worldwide
Club Med*	2004	International Agreement on Rights at Work	75% of Club Med facilities - will explore expanding scope to the remaining operations worldwide and has written assurance from the company that it is not hostile to such an approach
Danone	1994	International Agreements for Danone Workers	Companies of the Danone Group
Fonterra	2002	Global Agreement	Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited (Fonterra), including all subsidiary companies...
Carrefour	2000	Joint statement	Not disclosed
Falck	2005	Agreement of 21 March 2005 between Falck A/S of Copenhagen, Denmark and UNI establishing a Social Dialogue through a Worldwide Works Council	Membership of WWC from each country with at least 300 employees
France Telecom Group	2006	Worldwide agreement on fundamental labour rights within the France Telecom Group	Companies directly controlled by the France Telecom Group, i.e. companies in which France telecom group holds the majority of the capital or a majority of the voting rights or in which it appoints more than half the members of the administrative, management or monitoring bodies.

MNC	Year	Title	Application
G4S	2008	A Global Agreement between UNI and G4S Ethical Employment Partnership]	Companies over which G4S has direct control as owner or in which it has controlling interest
Metro	2003	Metro Group Principles on Social Partnership	All countries in which the Metro Group is active
Nampak	2006	Global Agreement on the Respect and Promotion of International Labour Standards between Nampak LTD and Union Network International	All Nampak operations where UNI has members and its subsidiaries, regardless of where they are located
Portugal Telecom	2006	Social Responsibility Code of Conduct between the Portugal Telecom Group, UNI, SINTAVV, STPT and SINDETELCO	All TU members of UNI who represent workers of the Portugal Telecom Group and who subscribe to this agreement
Securitas	2006	Agreement between Securitas and UNI and Swedish Transport Workers Union on the development of good working relations in the Securitas Group / The Securitas code of conduct (attached)	... to be respected and applied throughout the Securitas Group and, within Securitas' sphere of influence, by all those with whom Securitas does business.
Shoprite	2010	Global Framework Agreement between Shoprite International and Shoprite Checkers and UNI Global Union	All operations and subsidiaries where Shoprite Checkers formally recognises UNI Global Alliance Members
Telefonica	2001	Code of Conduct	... all Telefonica activities worldwide
Universal Postal Union (UN)	2005	Memorandum of Understanding between UPU and UNI	Not disclosed
Ciett	2008	Memorandum of understanding between CIETT Corporate Members and UNI Global Union on Temporary Agency Work	Agency staff, Commerce, Electricity, Finance, Gaming, Hair& Beauty, Graphical, IT & Business Services, Media & Entertainment, Postal, Property Services, Social Insurance, Telecoms

3. SUBSIDIARY / SUPPLIER / SUBCONTRACTOR AND LOCAL LAW STATEMENTS

MNC	Suppliers (P)	Subsidiary, subcontractor, supplier statement	Local law
GDF Suez	Criterion/ consequence	GDF SUEZ and all sub-contractors shall take full responsibility for all work being performed under the appropriate legal framework and, in particular, shall not seek to avoid obligations of the employer to dependent workers by disguising what would otherwise be an employment relationship or through the excessive use of temporary or agency labour. GDF SUEZ and all sub-contractors shall respect legal and contractual obligations to all workers under labour and social security laws, regulations, and collective bargaining agreements arising from the regular employment relationship (Social Security Minimum Standards Convention C102). GDF SUEZ and all sub-contractors shall pay social security and pension contributions for their workers where such provisions exist. Companies will ensure that workers are not classified as self-employed when working under conditions of direct employment (bogus self-employment). GDF SUEZ expects its partners to apply comparable principles and regards this to be an important basis for a lasting business relationship.	... respects local legislation, culture and practice; however, the Group expects its operations to respect the principles laid down in this agreement.
Impreglio	Mandatory	...engage only those contractors, subcontractors and suppliers which recognise and respect the criteria listed above	Not mentioned
Italcementi	Information / influence	"... commits itself to promote the same principles with its subsidiaries, contractors, subcontractors and suppliers."	Not mentioned
Lafarge	Criterion/ consequence	... seek to use the services of those trading partners, subcontractors, suppliers who recognise and implement...	Not mentioned
Royal BAM	Mandatory	... refrain from working with trading partners, subcontractors and suppliers who do not respect the criteria...	Not mentioned
Staedtler	Mandatory	...aim to collaborate only with those who comply / duty to inform / clauses in new contracts / questionnaires to suppliers for compliance	Not mentioned
Wilkhahn	Mandatory	... undertakes to conclude agreements with its licence partners and suppliers to ensure their compliance with these principles	Not mentioned
AngloGold Ashanti	Not mentioned	... not have direct control or in the case of subsidiaries the company will exercise its best effort to secure compliance with the standards and principles set out in this agreement in accordance with the economic, labour and cultural realities specific to each country in a spirit of continuous progress"	... enhance but not interfere with or replace
EDF	Criterion/ consequence	...significant stake without exercising any direct control, the signatory parties undertake to promote this Agreement in an effort to encourage the adoption and application of its provisions....-systematically ensure that the sub-contracting companies they call upon provide quality work and labour in full compliance with applicable laws and international standards. ...promote the principles of the United Nations Global Compact with regards to suppliers from whom they purchase goods and services.	... comply strictly with national and local laws as well as other collective agreements, and more particularly where such laws provide for more extensive requirement than the provisions of this Agreement.
Freudenberg	Not mentioned	No	Not mentioned

MNC	Suppliers (P)	Subsidiary, subcontractor, supplier statement	Local law
Lukoil	Information / influence	... not have direct control, it will exercise its best effort in order to secure compliance with the standards set out in this agreement. LUKOIL will notify its subcontractors and licensees and major suppliers of the existence of the Agreement and encourage them to comply with the standards and principles contained within it.	This obligation is voluntary and may be additional to formal legal requirements in the countries where LUKOIL is operating - issues best resolved on the ground and local agreements are primary
RAG->Evonik	Not mentioned	... apply only amongst the parties to this agreement.	... shall make every effort to ensure that labour safety, general labour conditions and labour protection will beat a standard at least equivalent to national best practices.
SCA	Information / influence	... not have direct control, it will exercise its best effort in order to secure compliance with the standards set out in this agreement. SCA will notify its subcontractors and licensees of this agreement and encourage compliance with the standards	As a minimum comply with all applicable legislative and regulatory requirements
StatoilHydro	Information / influence	Where it does not have direct control, it will exercise best efforts to secure compliance with the standards set out in this agreement. Will notify subcontractors and licensees of this agreement and encourage compliance	Not mentioned
Umicore	Information / influence	Umicore promotes and expressly encourages its business partners (subcontractors and suppliers) to take into account and apply ILO core labour standards in their own corporate policy	This agreement is governed by Belgian law. Consequently any disputes will fall within the exclusive competence of the Belgian courts.
Aker ASA	Criterion/ consequence	Not take responsibility but will notify and use influence - non-compliance with these standards will ultimately result in sanctions and potential termination of contractual relationship.	Not mentioned
ArcelorMittal	Criterion/ consequence	..companies in which the ARCELOR Group has a significant presence, albeit without exercising a dominant influence there, along with contractors and suppliers also fall within the scope of this agreement.	... the provisions of this agreement will apply as soon as local conditions allow. In the absence of legislation which complies with ARCELOR Group's international commitments, a convergence solution will be sought, based on international law, to achieve the group's objective with regard to sustainable development. Under Luxembourg Law
BMW	Criterion/ consequence	Business partners and suppliers encouraged to introduce comparable... expects to use these principles as basis for mutual dealings and regards them as suitable criterion for lasting business relations	... complying with laws in force in the different countries and locations and while recognising different cultural traditions.
Bosch	Mandatory	Bosch will not work with any suppliers who have demonstrably failed to comply with basic ILO labour standards.	Bosch will not work with any suppliers who have demonstrably failed to comply with basic ILO labour standards... associates will be informed through the proper channels about the content of the above principles.

MNC	Suppliers (P)	Subsidiary, subcontractor, supplier statement	Local law
DaimlerChrysler	Criterion/ consequence	... supports and encourages suppliers to introduce and implement equivalent principles... expects its suppliers to incorporate these principles as a basis for relations with DaimlerChrysler	National law rules except in the case of freedom of association which ... " will be granted even in those countries in which freedom of association is not protected by law."
EADS NV	Criterion/ consequence	Compliance serves as a criterion for selecting suppliers - expected to recognise and apply and encourage equivalents	Curbed in the case of union representation... EADS also respects the right of all workers to elect their representatives wherever this right is stipulated by the law or local regulations.
GEA	Criterion/ consequence	... expressly supports and encourages business partners to apply or consider agreed codes in the respective in-house corporate policy.	Not mentioned
Leoni	Criterion/ consequence	... support and encourages its business partners to take this declaration into account in their own respective corporate policy. It views this as advantageous basis for mutual relationships	National law rules except in the case of freedom of association which ... " will be granted even in those countries in which freedom of association is not protected by law."
Prym	Criterion/ consequence	... supports and encourages business partners, to consider this declaration in their own respective company policy. Herein it sees an advantageous basis for the mutual relations.	Conventions restricted to national standards for those outside the four core conventions.
Renault	Mandatory	Yes in terms of child labour and forced labour / otherwise inform and encourage... "the actual adoption of these principles is a basis for long-term relations	Not mentioned
Rheinmetall	Criterion/ consequence	Supports and expressly encourages its business partners to take into account and apply agreed guidelines in their own corporate policy... in doing so it lays the basis for promising future business relations.	Not mentioned
SKF	Information / influence	Encouraged to adhere to similar codes of conduct	Not mentioned
Vallourec	Mandatory	... demands the observance of these fundamental rights from its suppliers and subcontractors, and integrates these criteria into its evaluations.	... applies the international conventions and national laws and respects the national cultures and local customs
Volkswagen	Criterion/ consequence	..supports and expressly encourages its contractors to take this declaration into account in their own respective corporate policy.	... goals ensues under consideration of applicable law and prevailing customs in the different countries and locations
Inditex	Mandatory	...apply and insist on observance of the ILO Standards on Freedom of Association and the Right to Bargain Collectively throughout its "supply chain" including to all workers, whether they be directly employed by Inditex or by its external manufacturers and suppliers...for other standards...GUF and Company to work together the ensure full compliance	... if they offer greater protection, local laws apply.
Accor	Not mentioned	... encourage management of subsidiaries and entities to allow union representatives to carry out their mandates...	Not mentioned
Club Med*	Not mentioned	Not mentioned	Not mentioned

MNC		Suppliers (P)	Subsidiary, subcontractor, supplier statement	Local law
Danone	Not mentioned	Not mentioned		... subject to legal and statutory provisions in effect in the country concerned.
Fonterra	Information / influence	Information / influence	... will inform joint venture partners of Fonterra's obligations under this agreement.	Apply consistently but not intended to replace local employee relations practice etc. - make first effort to resolve there - recourse to review committee, beyond AGM functions, restricted to alleged serious or systemic violations of rights in the agreement that cannot satisfactorily be resolved at local level.
Carrefour	Criterion/ consequence	Criterion/ consequence	..ensure that the principles established by the ILO are respected by its suppliers (though this may just apply to child labour)	Not mentioned
Falck	Not mentioned	Not mentioned		Not mentioned
France Telecom Group	Information / influence	Information / influence	...where has significant presence without exercising direct control, the signatories undertake to promote the present agreement and to encourage its implementation, while respecting the independence of those companies.... will inform its suppliers and subcontractors of the existence of this agreement. Effectively demonstrating the adoption of these principles is a favourable foundation for long-term partnerships.	...the commitment to ILO applies also to all countries which have not ratified ILO agreements.
G4S	Information / influence	Information / influence	Where the Company does not have a controlling interest or cannot exercise effective control for reasons of local legislation it will use its influence in order to seek to secure compliance with the standards set out in this agreement. The Company will endeavour to work with business partners who conduct their business in a way compatible with the agreement	No part of the agreement is legally enforceable as each country has its own laws. Noting the competitiveness of the industry and that many competitors do not respect working hours and pay, UNI and local union and G4S commit to work together if G4S start losing market share to monitor and raise standards among all companies in market so that G4S can raise standards without compromising its competitive position / if cannot - goes to review meeting, if not then the union rights that go beyond legal requirements may be suspended at the local level until such time as the issues are resolved.
Metro	Not mentioned	Not mentioned		"...within the scope of national rights and laws."
Nampak	Information / influence	No		...operate within the framework and jurisdiction of the applicable laws whilst respecting all ILO standards.
Portugal Telecom	Mandatory		... third companies wishing to be awarded outsourcing contracts, jobs, works or any other type of service by the Group, will have to abide by the principles enshrined in this agreement.	Not mentioned

MNC	Suppliers (P)	Subsidiary, subcontractor, supplier statement	Local law
Securitas	Criterion/ consequence	Must comply with the Code or may risk not having further business.	The parties acknowledge that social, cultural, legal and other factors may differ from country to country and that such differences naturally have to be taken into consideration in the application of the Code.
Shoprite	Information / influence	...strive, in dealings with suppliers, to engage with those that share its commitment to the principles of good governance	...in compliance with the legal minimum standards set out in each country... different countries have different laws governing employment. Both Shoprite Checkers and UNI Global Union undertake to operate within the framework and jurisdiction of the applicable laws.
Telefonica	Information / influence	... the company will tell companies that would like to provide contracts and services the need to adhere to these principles.	Not mentioned
Universal Postal Union (UN)	Not mentioned	Not disclosed	Not mentioned
Ciett	Not mentioned	Not mentioned	Not mentioned

4. DISSEMINATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

MMC	Responsibility for dissemination	Implementation	Duration (P)	Meetings	Host unions representation at Dialogue?	Separate dispute resolution mechanism	Training of union members for implementation mentioned?
GDF Suez	Both parties	Annual joint information and discussion meetings	3 years	Annual	Yes	Yes	Yes
Impregilo	All parties	Consulting Group of signatories	Open	Annual	No	No	No
Italcementi	Company - work places, suppliers, contractors and subcontractors. Translated, website and intranet publicity; training to be provided to local workers and union representatives.	Joint reference group to follow and monitor; training	Open	Annual	No	No	Yes
Lafarge	Company to provide information in all countries where this agreement is applicable / All parties strongly committed to dissemination	Joint reference group to follow and monitor	Open	Annual	No	No	No
Royal BAM	Company to provide information on this agreement in written and verbal form	Joint reference group to follow and monitor	Open	Annual	No	No	No
Staedtler	Company - employees in all affiliates in their language	Joint monitoring team to evaluate and supervise implementation, meetings on all sites of the Staedtler Group	Open	Biannual	Yes	No	No
Wilkhahn	The Company is responsible	Joint annual meetings and internal audits	Open	Annual	Yes	Yes	No
AngloGold Ashanti	GUF and company to distribute and advise of rights and duties	Joint reference group to follow and monitor	Open	Annual	Yes	No	Yes
EDF	All signatories jointly responsible	Joint implementation; Consultation Committee on EDF Group CSR	3 years	Annual	Yes	No	Yes
Freudenberg	Both parties	Joint annual meeting to monitor the agreement	Dec. 2001 (Renewed 2002)	Annual	No	No	No
Lukoil	Both parties	Annual joint meetings	1 year	Annual	Yes	No	Yes
RAG->Evonik	Company to inform board members and employees, ICEM to inform member organisations	Regular consultation and information about implementation	1 year	Not disclosed	No	No	No
SCA	Company to inform business groups and make local site management aware of obligations // Ice distribute to affiliates and broadly publicise	Annual joint meetings	2 years (updated 2007)	Annual	Yes	Yes	No
StatoilHydro	Both parties	Joint annual meetings to review implementation; training to facilitate implementation	2 years (renewed 2001,2003,2005)	Annual	No	No	Yes
Umicore	Company to make available in usual Umicore languages	Joint committee responsible for monitoring the implementation; report from external auditor	4 years	Annual	Yes		No
Aker ASA	Company - within 90 days // IMF and Felles to all member unions / Company to all companies and make available to partners and contractors	Joint annual meeting to monitor the agreement	2 years	Annual	No	Yes	Yes
ArcelorMittal	All signatories jointly responsible	Joint group level committee responsible for monitoring implementation	3 years	Not disclosed	Yes	No	No
BMW	"in the appropriate manner"	Consultations on compliance will take place periodically via the Euro-Forum	Open	Not disclosed	No	No	No
Bosch	Company, after consulting employee representatives	Part of Management System Manual; senior management responsible for implementation; implementation discussed with European Committee	Open	Not disclosed	No	Yes	No
DaimlerChrysler	Company	Senior management responsible for compliance; Corporate Audit also to examine and take action	Open	Not disclosed	No	Yes	No
EADS NV	Company	Senior management responsible for compliance; reporting and consultation at EWC	Open	Not disclosed	No	Yes	No
GEA	Not disclosed	Information on observance of agreement will take place in the EWC and EWC presiding committee	Open	Annual	No	No	No
Leoni	Company	Internal Auditing Department will monitor compliance; report and discussion at annual EWC meetings	Open	Annual	No	No	No
Pym	"... employees are to be informed"	EWC is informed and consulted about implementation and violation procedures.	Open	Annual - with EWC, not CLUF	No	No	No
Renault	Not disclosed	Management and group works council will ensure implementation; evaluation together with signatories	Open	Not disclosed	No	No	No
Rheinmetall	Both parties - company and workers' representatives	Senior management and workers representatives responsible for implementation; information exchange at EWC	Open	Annual	No	No	No
SKF	Not disclosed	Regular joint supervision	Open	Not disclosed	No	No	No
Vallourec	Not disclosed - shall be brought to the notice of the staff	Report at annual meeting of EWC	Not disclosed	Annual	No	Yes	No
Volkswagen	Both parties and unions or employee representatives within plants	Implementation is discussed within the framework of the Group Global Works Council	Open	Not disclosed	No	No	No

MMC	Responsibility for dissemination	Implementation	Duration (P)	Meetings	Host unions representation at Dialogue?	Separate dispute resolution mechanism	Training of union members for implementation mentioned?
Inditex	Both parties	Joint committee to review application of agreement; CFA linked to Inditex Code of Conduct for External Manufacturers and Suppliers	1 year and then Open	Annual	No	Yes	No
Accor	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	Open	Not disclosed	No	No	No
Club Med*	Not disclosed	Joint implementation committee	3 years	Annual	No	No	No
Danone	Both parties	Review during plenary meetings	Open	Not disclosed	No	No	No
Fonterra	Both parties	Joint review committee to review application of the agreement	Open	Annual	No	No	Yes
Barclays Africa**							
Carrefour	No	Not disclosed	Open	Not disclosed	No	No	No
Falck	No	This agreement establishes a World Works Council in accordance with Art. 13 EVC directive	Open	Annual	Yes	No	Yes
France Telecom Group	Both parties	Joint implementation	Open	Twice a year	No	Yes	No
C4S	Both parties	Not disclosed	Open	Twice a year	No	Yes	No
Metro	Not mentioned	In the scope of social dialogue on an international level, the umbrella organisations of the national employer associations and union in commerce are METRO Group's external partners. The METRO Group Euro-Forum constitutes the internal discussion platform for transnational topics	Open	Not disclosed	No	No	No
Nampak	Company to all of its UNI affiliated local plants, UNI may distribute as appropriate	Annual joint information and discussion meetings; meetings can be requested by either party	Open	Annual	Yes	No	No
Portugal Telecom	All parties	Annual joint information and discussion meetings	2 years	Annual	No	No	No
Securitas	UNI and Securitas - of the Code and the Agreement	Implementation group; local implementation group if required	2 years, then Open	Annual	No	Yes	No
Shoptite	Company to communicate with the management / UNI to ensure affiliates are supportive of local operations and work in the agreement and local laws.	Both parties	Open	Annual	Yes	No	No
Telefonica	Company to provide information to all companies of the group	Joint responsibility for implementation via regular meetings; joint group report to UNI and Telefonica presidents	5 years	Not disclosed	No	No	No
Universal Postal Union (UNI)	Not disclosed	This agreement establishes cooperation to promote social dialogue	Open	Not disclosed	No	No	No
Cleff	Both parties	Joint annual meeting	Open	Twice a year	No	No	No